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This paper analyzes the optimality of multiple-bank lending, when ﬁrms and
banks are subject to moral hazard and monitoring is essential. Multiple-bank
lending leads to higher per-project monitoring whenever the beneﬁto fg r e a t e r
diversiﬁcation dominates the costs of free-riding and duplication of eﬀort. The
model predicts a greater use of multiple-bank lending when banks are highly
leveraged, ﬁrms are less proﬁtable and monitoring costs are high. These results
are consistent with some empirical observations concerning the use of multiple-
bank lending in small and medium business lending.
JEL classiﬁcation: D82; G21; G32.
Keywords: multiple monitors, diversiﬁcation, free-riding problem, multiple-
bank lending.
11I n t r o d u c t i o n
There seems to be a wide consensus among economists on the role that banks perform
in the economy. The theoretical literature portrays banks as reducing information
asymmetries between investors and borrowers. In originating loans and monitoring
borrowers, banks acquire private information about their customers and enhance the
value of investment projects (e.g., Boot and Thakor, 2000). The empirical literature
supports this view, and suggests improved project payoﬀsa st h es p e c i a lf e a t u r eo f
bank lending relative to capital market lending (see, e.g., the review in Ongena and
Smith, 2000a).
Despite the emphasis on the monitoring ro l eo fb a n k s ,t h ei s s u eo ft h eo p t i m a l
number of monitors remains unclear. According to the theory of banks as delegated
monitors (Diamond, 1984), if banks can expand indeﬁnitely and achieve fully diversi-
ﬁed portfolios, they exert the ﬁrst best monitoring level and have no (or low) default
risk. Thus exclusive bank-ﬁrm relationships involving a single monitor are optimal
since they avoid free-riding problems and duplication of monitoring eﬀorts. While
being certainly appealing, this prediction seems at odds with the fact that in reality
banks are of ﬁnite size and exclusive bank-ﬁrm relationships are often not observed.
For example, Ongena and Smith (2000b)d o c u m e n tt h a tl e s st h a n1 5 %o ft h eﬁrms in
a sample from 20 European countries maintain a single relationship. Moreover, even
if the number of bank relationships tends to increase with ﬁrm size, also small and
medium enterprises (SMEs) borrow from more than one bank at some point in their
life cycle as reported for countries like the US, Italy and Portugal (e.g., Petersen and
Rajan, 1994; Detragiache et al., 2000; and Farinha and Santos, 2002).
These empirical observations raise a number of important questions. If monitor-
ing is one of the main functions −if not the main function− that banks exert, why
should they decide to share ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing if this reduces their monitoring function?
Does the great use of multiple-bank lending suggest that the role of banks as dele-
gated monitors is of minor importance? Or does multiple-bank lending entail some
−previously unnoticed− beneﬁts for banks’ incentives to monitor? These questions
are of particular importance in contexts where monitoring is essential due to informa-
tion opacity and the need to process soft information, like small and medium business
lending (e.g., Cole et al., 2004).
2To better understand the role of banks as monitors in the context of multiple
bank relationships, we present a simple model where banks face limited diversiﬁcation
opportunities so that, diﬀerently from Diamond (1984), they cannot construct fully
diversiﬁed portfolios. In this context, we show that multiple-bank lending may allow
banks to mitigate the agency problem with depositors and achieve higher monitoring
a n de x p e c t e dp r o ﬁts.
Our starting point is a simple one-period model of bank lending with double moral
hazard, where banks of limited size raise deposits from investors and grant loans to
entrepreneurs. Firms need external funds to undertake investment projects and can
privately decide whether to exert eﬀort and increase project success probabilities.
Banks can ameliorate ﬁrms’ moral hazard problem through monitoring, which is,
however, costly and not observable.
The unobservability of monitoring introduces another moral hazard problem be-
tween banks and depositors. Given that banks cannot perfectly diversify when lending
individually, their incentives to monitor depend on the level of equity they have, the
cost of monitoring, the proﬁtability of ﬁrms, and most importantly, on whether they
lend to ﬁrms individually or share lending with other banks. Multiple-bank lending
allows the ﬁnancing of more independent projects. Greater diversiﬁcation improves
banks’ monitoring incentives, as it reduces the variance of the return of their portfo-
lios and allows banks to be residual claimants of any additional marginal beneﬁto f
monitoring. This lowers deposit rates and improves monitoring incentives further. At
the same time, however, since banks do not coordinate on their monitoring choices
and project success probabilities depend on the eﬀort of all of them, multiple-bank
lending involves free-riding and duplication of eﬀort. When the agency problem be-
t w e e nb a n k sa n dd e p o s i t o r si ss u ﬃciently severe, the beneﬁt of greater diversiﬁcation
dominates the drawbacks of free-riding and duplication of eﬀort, and multiple-bank
lending leads to higher per-project monitoring than individual-bank lending.
The model predicts that the attractiveness of sharing lending decreases with the
amount of banks’ equity and ﬁrms’ prior proﬁtability, while it increases with the
cost of monitoring. These predictions are in line with various empirical ﬁndings.
Concerning inside equity, Karceski et al. (2004) and Degryse et al. (2004) ﬁnd
that banks tend to terminate relationships with ﬁrms borrowing from multiple banks
3after consolidation when their inside equity is larger. In line with our prediction on
ﬁrms’ proﬁtability, Petersen and Rajan (1994), Detragiache et al. (2000), Farinha
and Santos (2002), and Guiso and Minetti (2006) document a greater use of multiple-
bank lending for ﬁrms with lower prior proﬁtability. As for the cost of monitoring,
the results in Guiso and Minetti (2006) indicate that less opaque ﬁrms for which the
cost of monitoring is lower borrow more from individual lenders.
The main insight of the paper is to provide in a static model a new explanation
for the use of multiple-bank lending as a way to improve monitoring incentives. The
analysis is suited for the study of bank-ﬁrm relationships when monitoring is impor-
tant and banks need greater diversiﬁcation to improve the value of the relationships as
is the case in small and medium business lending.1 The model hinges around two fea-
tures −leverage and limited diversiﬁcation opportunities− that have been identiﬁed
as important in banking (see, e.g., Marquez, 2002, and other papers cited therein).
The incentive mechanism of diversiﬁcation works only if banks raise deposits. Other-
wise, diversiﬁcation reduces the variance of the return of banks’ portfolios but has no
impact on their monitoring incentives. Possible ways to justify banks’ limited diver-
siﬁcation opportunities are constraints on their loanable funds through, for example,
binding capital requirements or limits to the number of proﬁtable projects banks can
ﬁnance.
The previous literature on the number of bank relationships has explained multiple-
bank lending in terms of two ineﬃciencies of exclusive bank-ﬁrm relationships2.F i r s t ,
according to the hold-up literature, sharing lending avoids the expropriation of in-
formational rents and improves ﬁrms’ incentives to make proper investment choices
(e.g., Rajan, 1992; Hellwig, 1991 and 2000; and, in particular, von Thadden, 1992 and
2004). Second, multiple-bank lending helps with the soft-budget-constraint problem
in that it enables banks not to extend further ineﬃcient credit, thus reducing ﬁrms’
strategic defaults (Dewatripont and Maskin, 1995; Bolton and Scharfstein, 1996).
Both of these theories consider multiple-bank lending as a way to improve entre-
1The focus on SMEs also has the advantage that banks’ decisions to enter into multiple relation-
ships are very unlikely to be driven by regulatory limits on bank exposures to individual ﬁrms (see,
e.g., Berger et al., 2005).
2Other explanations for multiple bank relationships include ﬁrms’ desire to reduce overmoni-
toring problems and the liquidity risk aﬀecting exclusive bank-ﬁrm relationships (Carletti, 2004;
Detragiache et al., 2000).
4preneurs’ incentives, and focus on ﬁrms’ decisions to borrow from more than one
bank. Neither of them, however, addresses how multiple-bank lending aﬀects banks’
incentives to monitor, and thus cannot explain the apparent discrepancy between
the empirical observation of multiple bank relationships and the importance of bank
monitoring. In contrast, we analyze the incentives of multiple monitors, and show
that multiple-bank lending can be compatible with the monitoring role of banks.
Other papers have analyzed the role of banks as monitors in explaining various
features of relationship banking. Besanko and Kanatas (1993) focus on banks’ incen-
tives to monitor to justify the coexistence of banks and capital markets in a context
where only one bank operates and monitors. Carletti (2004) analyzes why ﬁrms
may prefer to borrow from multiple lenders when individual-bank lending leads to
an overmonitoring problem. Winton (1995) builds on the trade-oﬀ between portfolio
diversiﬁcation and capitalization as factors aﬀecting banks’ monitoring incentives in
order to explain banks’ ﬁnite size and analyze the welfare eﬀects of diﬀerent inter-
mediated equilibria. In contrast, we analyze how the number of bank relationships
aﬀects banks’ monitoring incentives when banks have limited lending capacities and
greater diversiﬁcation helps reduce the agency problem vis a vis depositors. In this
respect, the paper extends the analysis in Cerasi and Daltung (2000) by analyz-
ing multiple-bank lending in terms of greater diversiﬁcation and better monitoring
incentives.3
Finally, the paper shares some insights with the literature on ﬁnancial structure
as a commitment to monitor. As in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), Chiesa (2001) and
Almazan (2002) we focus on the importance of limited lending capacities, but enrich
the framework by introducing multiple monitors and diversiﬁcation opportunities.
These features link the paper also to Thakor (1996), who analyzes ﬁrms’ incentives
to borrow from multiple banks as a way to reduce the probability of being credit
rationed. In contrast, we analyze diﬀerent lending structures in a context where banks
perform postlending monitoring and multiple-bank relationships does not always lead
to higher expected proﬁts for banks.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic
model. Section 3 analyzes the equilibrium with individual-bank lending, and Section
3A contrasting view is in Winton (1999), where diversiﬁcation may worsen banks’ incentives to
monitor and increase their chance of failure when loans are suﬃciently exposed to sector downturns.
54 presents the one with multiple-bank lending. Section 5 compares the two equilibria
and discusses the lending structure with higher expected proﬁts for banks. Section
6 extends the basic model. Section 7 discusses the robustness of the analysis. The
empirical predictions of the model are contained in Section 8, and concluding remarks
a r ei nS e c t i o n9 .
2 The basic model
Consider a two-date economy (T =0 ,1) with two banks, numerous ﬁrms and in-
vestors. Firms have access to a risky investment project, and need external funds to
ﬁnance it. Banks have one unit of funds each, and extend loans. Thus ﬁrms compete
to attract bank funds and only two ﬁr m sa tm o s to b t a i nﬁnancing.
Projects are risky and their returns are i.i.d. across ﬁrms. Each project i ∈ {1,2}
requires 1 unit of indivisible investment at date 0, and yields a return Xi = {0,R}
at date 1. The success probability of project i, pi =P r {Xi = R},d e p e n d so nt h e
behavior of its entrepreneur. It is pH if he behaves well, and pL if he misbehaves, with
pH >p L. Misbehavior renders entrepreneurs a non-transferable private beneﬁt B,
which can be thought of as a quiet life, managerial perks, and diversion of corporate
revenues for private use. There is a moral hazard problem because entrepreneurs’
behavioral choices are not observable.
Banks have an amount of inside equity E and raise an amount of deposits D =
1−E so that they have limited loanable funds equal to D+E = 1. With individual-
bank lending each bank lends its funds to one ﬁrm, while with multiple-bank lending
banks share lending and each of them ﬁnances two ﬁrms. (We relax this assumption
in Section 6 below.) In either case the banks cannot perfectly diversify, but ﬁnancing
two ﬁrms allow them to achieve a better degree of diversiﬁcation than ﬁnancing only
one, for given total loanable funds.
Banks extend loans to entrepreneurs if they expect non-negative proﬁts, i.e., if
they expect a return at least equal to the gross return y ≥ 1 from an alternative
investment. To provide a role for bank monitoring, we assume that lending without
monitoring is not feasible. Speciﬁcally, we proceed under the assumptions:





) <B ,( A 2 )
where ∆ = pH − pL. Assumption (A1) means that projects are creditworthy only if
ﬁrms behave well. Assumption (A2) entails that the private beneﬁt B is suﬃciently
high to induce ﬁrms to misbehave even when loan rates are set at the lowest possible
level
y
pH that makes banks break even. Said diﬀerently, (A2) implies that ﬁrms cannot
be given monetary incentives to behave well. Given (A1) and (A2), bank monitoring
is essential for project ﬁnancing to take place, since otherwise ﬁrms misbehave and
banks make negative proﬁts.
Bank monitoring allows banks to detect and prevent ﬁrms’ misbehavior thus in-
creasing the success probability of the project. Each bank j ∈ {1,2} chooses to moni-
tor project i with an eﬀort mij ∈ [0,1], which corresponds to the probability the bank
makes ﬁrm i behave well.4 Monitoring is costly; an eﬀort mij costs C(mij)=c
2m2
ij.
The convex cost function reﬂects the greater diﬃculty for a bank to ﬁnd out more and
more about a ﬁrm and control entrepreneurial action; and it implies diseconomies of
scale in monitoring. The size of the monitoring costs is determined by the parameter
c (henceforth, also referred to as the cost of monitoring).
Banks’ monitoring eﬀorts are not observable to either investors or other banks.
This introduces another moral hazard problem in the model. Banks choose the
amount of monitoring to maximize their expected proﬁts, and the equilibrium moni-
toring level depends on the number of ﬁrms (or projects) banks ﬁnance.
The timing of the model is as follows. At the beginning of date 0 each bank sets
a deposit rate. Investors deposit their funds and the banks use these funds to make
loans to ﬁrms. Then each bank chooses the eﬀort mij with which to monitor project
i. At date 1 project returns are realized and claims are settled. Figure 1 summarizes
the timing of the model.
Insert Figure 1
We solve the model by ﬁrst analyzing the equilibrium with individual-bank lending
and then analyzing the equilibrium with multiple-bank lending. Finally, we compare
4The monitoring technology builds on Besanko and Kanatas (1993) in that monitoring induces
entrepreneurs to behave well. An alternative possible interpretation is that banks can provide some
valuable advice to ﬁrms about how to run their investment projects, thus increasing their success
probabilities.
7the equilibria in the two lending structures and consider which one leads to higher
expected proﬁts for banks.
3 Individual-bank lending
We start by characterizing the equilibrium with individual-bank lending (henceforth
IL). Each bank j sets the deposit rate rj to give depositors a return at least equal to
the alternative return y,a n dﬁnances one ﬁrm. Then it chooses the monitoring eﬀort
mij that maximizes its expected proﬁt. Since banks act independently of each other
and behave symmetrically, we focus for simplicity on a single representative bank and
as i n g l eﬁrm, thus avoiding subscripts.
The bank’s expected proﬁt can be expressed as





where the ﬁrst term represents the expected return from the project after depositors
have been repaid, the second term is the opportunity cost of banks’ capital, and the
third term is the monitoring cost.
As expression (1) shows, the deposit contract carries a bankruptcy risk. Since
the bank is subject to limited liability and grants risky loans, depositors may not
obtain the promised deposit rate. The probability of them being repaid depends on
the success probability of the project, which is given by
p = mpH +( 1− m)pL = pL + m∆,
where m is the probability of (successfully) detecting entrepreneurial misbehavior.
Thus, the higher m, the higher the project success probability, and the more likely it
is the bank can honor its repayment obligation. We can then rewrite (1) as










where [r − S]D = rD−E max{rD − X,0} is the expected return to depositors, and
S =( 1−p)r is the per-unit expected shortfall on the deposit contract. Since there is
an excess demand for bank credit, ﬁrms compete away their pecuniary returns from
the projects to attract funds and banks retain all the surplus R.
Proposition 1 characterizes the individual-bank lending case.
8Proposition 1 The equilibrium with individual-bank lending, in which each bank
monitors each project with eﬀort mIL and oﬀers the deposit rate rIL, is characterized




IL =0 , (3)
r
IL − S
IL = y, (4)
where ∂SIL
∂mIL = −∆rIL.
Proof. See the appendix.
Proposition 1 shows the importance of bank monitoring in the model. Monitoring
makes lending feasible, and banks have an incentive to always exert a positive eﬀort
since the marginal unit at 0 is costless (C0(0) = 0). As already mentioned, however,
raising deposits implies the well-known moral hazard problem of external ﬁnancing.
A higher monitoring level beneﬁts both banks and depositors, as it reduces the bank-
ruptcy risk of the deposit contract and consequently the expected shortfalls. Since
only banks incur the cost of monitoring and deposit rates are set before monitoring is
decided, banks’ incentives are reduced and decrease with the size of expected short-
falls. The second term in (3), ∂SIL
∂mILD, captures this incentive mechanism. This term
has a negative sign (since ∂SIL
∂mIL = −∆rIL) indicating that lower monitoring increases
both the expected shortfalls and their derivative. The size of the expected shortfalls
depends on the (exogenous) distribution of the return of the project X and the level
of monitoring m. This suggests an interrelation between monitoring and expected
shortfalls. On the one hand, the lower the expected shortfalls −that is, the lower the
variance of the distribution of X− the higher the monitoring m in equilibrium. On
the other hand, the higher m the lower the expected shortfalls and their derivative.
Banks’ monitoring aﬀects also the deposit rate rIL in (4) through the size of the
expected shortfalls SIL. Banks set the per-unit deposit rate at the lowest level which
induces investors to deposit their funds. The value of rIL rises when banks exert
a low level of monitoring, since depositors have to be compensated for the higher
expected shortfalls. This in turn increases SIL and ∂SIL
∂mIL, thus reducing monitoring
even further.
9The severity of banks’ moral hazard problem depends on the level of inside equity
E (or alternatively, the amount of deposits D), the project return R,a n dt h ec o s t
of monitoring c.Ah i g hl e v e lo fE (or a small amount of deposits) improves banks’
incentive to monitor and decreases the expected shortfalls. This eﬀect is well known
(e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Reducing the amount of external ﬁnancing allows
banks to beneﬁt more from their monitoring thus improving their incentives. The
same happens for a high R or a low c because they increase the marginal beneﬁt
banks appropriate from monitoring. Thus, the equilibrium monitoring eﬀort mIL
grows with the amount of inside equity and the project return, whereas it falls with
the cost of monitoring.
4 Multiple-bank lending
We now turn to the equilibrium with multiple-bank lending (henceforth ML). As
before, the equilibrium requires that each bank j sets the deposit rate rj to satisfy
investors’ participation constraints, and that it chooses the monitoring eﬀort mij for
each project i so as to maximize its expected proﬁt.
The diﬀerence with the individual-bank lending case is that now the two banks
ﬁnance both ﬁrms and interact in their monitoring decisions. We assume that each
bank lends a half unit to each ﬁrm and obtains a return of R
2 per project in the
case of success. Since there is an excess demand for bank credit and banks have
limited lending capacities, they extract the surplus from the entrepreneurs and share
the full return in the case of success. Banks choose how much to monitor each
project simultaneously and, given the non-observability of their eﬀorts, also non-
cooperatively. Their eﬀorts are however interrelated in the impact on the success
probability of the project. It is enough that one bank detects misbehavior to increase
the success probability of the whole project. The idea is that monitoring delivers a
public good, and all banks ﬁnancing a ﬁrm beneﬁt from the higher success probability
of the project.
Given these considerations, the total monitoring eﬀort (or probability of detection)
that the two banks exert in project i is
Mi =1− (1 − mij)(1 − mi,−j), (5)
10and the success probability of project i is
pi = MipH +( 1− Mi)pL = pL + Mi∆,( 6 )
with i,j ∈ {1,2} and j 6= −j. Since each bank j ﬁnances two (independent) projects,
it has a (total) return from the loans Z =
Xi+X−i
2 with i 6= −i, and expected proﬁt
equal to








Similarly to before, the ﬁrst term in (7) represents the expected return from the two
projects that bank j ﬁnances net of depositors’ repayment, the second term is the
opportunity cost of capital, and the third term is the total cost of monitoring the
projects.
As with individual-bank lending, the deposit contract carries a bankruptcy risk
because banks may not be able to repay depositors in full. The size of such risk is
diﬀerent now in that the return of loans Z has another distribution and banks will
choose a diﬀerent monitoring level in equilibrium. Again we can deﬁne [rj − S]D =
rjD − E max{rjD − Z,0} as the expected return to depositors, with S being the

















(see Section A of the appendix for a full derivation of (8) and the exact expression
for S).
Expressions (5), (6) and (8) show the features of multiple-bank lending. First,
banks now ﬁnance two independent projects and reach a greater degree of diversiﬁ-
cation than with individual-bank lending, given the same total loanable funds. This
reduces ceteris paribus the variance of banks’ portfolio returns thus lowering depos-
itors’ expected shortfalls and improving monitoring incentives. Second, the success
probability of each project depends on the monitoring of both banks. This creates
a free-riding problem. Since monitoring is privately costly and not observable, each
bank has an incentive to reduce its own eﬀort and beneﬁt from the other bank’s mon-
itoring. Third, there is a duplication of eﬀort because banks do not coordinate in the
choice of their monitoring eﬀorts.
Proposition 2 characterizes the equilibrium with multiple-bank lending.
11Proposition 2 The equilibrium with multiple-bank lending is unique and symmetric.
Each bank monitors each project with eﬀort mij = mML and oﬀers the deposit rate







ML =0 , (9)
r
ML− S
ML = y. (10)
Proof. See the appendix, which contains also the expression for ∂SML
∂mML.
Comparing equation (9) with (3) shows how banks’ equilibrium monitoring ef-
forts with multiple-bank lending diﬀer from those with individual-bank lending. On
the one hand, free-riding and duplication of eﬀort curtail banks’ incentives (the term
1
2(1 − mML)), thus increasing the expected shortfalls. On the other hand, greater
diversiﬁcation enhances banks’ incentives via a reduction of the variance of the dis-
tribution of the return of the loans Z and thus of the expected shortfalls SML and
their derivative. The equilibrium monitoring eﬀort mML balances these contrasting
eﬀects.
The equilibrium with individual and multiple-bank lending diﬀers also in terms of
deposit rates. As equations (10) and (4) show, the diﬀerence in deposit rates depends
on the expected shortfalls SML and SIL, and thus again on how greater diversiﬁcation,
free-riding and duplication of eﬀort aﬀect them. As before, the deposit rate has an
indirect eﬀect in equilibrium on the amount of monitoring banks exert through the
term ∂SML
∂mML in (9). Thus, the higher rML, the higher is SML and the lower is mML.
To sum up, multiple-bank lending implies a trade-oﬀ in terms of monitoring incen-
tives by improving bank diversiﬁcation while at the same time introducing free-riding
and duplication of eﬀort. This trade-oﬀ arises because monitoring eﬀorts are not
observable and banks cannot cooperate in their monitoring choices. If they could,
multiple-bank lending would only imply greater diversiﬁcation and would always lead
to higher individual monitoring and expected proﬁts than individual-bank lending.5
As we will see in the next section, however, even in the absence of cooperation,
5Note also that, even if banks could cooperate, they would not ﬁnd it optimal to delegate the
monitoring task to one of them because of convex monitoring costs. More importantly, delegation
is not feasible in our context because banks get symmetric rewards from monitoring.
12multiple-bank lending may imply higher per-project monitoring than individual-bank
lending even if the individual monitoring eﬀorts may be lower. Whether this hap-
pens will depend crucially on the marginal eﬀect of diversiﬁcation, which is in turn
determined by the amount of inside equity E, the project return R,a n dt h ec o s to f
monitoring c.
5 Comparing individual-bank and multiple-bank
lending
We now turn to the comparison of banks’ equilibrium expected proﬁts with individual-
bank and multiple-bank lending to determine the optimal lending structure. Once we
substitute D + E = 1 and the respective equilibrium monitoring eﬀorts and deposit
rates in (2) and (8), we can express banks’ expected proﬁts as:
π
IL = p





2,( 1 1 )
π
ML = p
MLR − y − c(m
ML)
2,( 1 2 )
if they lend individually or share lending, respectively. In both expressions the terms
represent, in order, the expected return from the projects each bank ﬁnances, the
return from the alternative investment −which is equal from (4) and (10) to the
expected repayment to depositors − and the total monitoring costs.
Whether multiple-bank lending leads to higher expected proﬁts than individual-
bank lending depends on the relative diﬀerences between per-project success probabil-
ities −and therefore per-project monitoring eﬀorts− and total monitoring costs in (11)
and (12). Given the complex analytical expressions for the equilibrium monitoring
eﬀorts and the expected shortfalls, we cannot directly compare these two expressions.
We then proceed in two steps. We ﬁrst compare per-project monitoring eﬀorts with
individual and multiple-bank lending, and study how they interrelate with monitor-
ing costs in determining banks’ expected proﬁts. Then, we analyze which lending
structure leads to higher expected proﬁts for banks. We start with the following
result.
Proposition 3 There exists a value m ∈ (0,1) such that the per-project monitoring
eﬀort with multiple-bank lending is higher than with individual-bank lending (MML >
mIL) if the individual monitoring eﬀort is mML > m.
13Proof. See the appendix.
Proposition 3 shows that the beneﬁt of greater diversiﬁcation attainable with
multiple-bank lending may be important enough to achieve greater per-project moni-
toring than with individual-bank lending. To see when this result occurs, we conduct
some comparative statics.
Proposition 4 The threshold m ∈ (0,1) increases with the amount of inside equity
E and the project return R, while it decreases with the cost of monitoring c.
Proof. See the appendix.
The basic intuition behind Proposition 4 is that multiple-bank lending leads to
higher per-project monitoring eﬀorts than individual-bank lending when banks’ moral
hazard problem is severe enough. If banks exert a low level of monitoring when lending
individually, the greater diversiﬁcation attainable with multiple-bank lending has a
signiﬁcant marginal impact on banks’ monitoring incentives and may dominate the
drawbacks of free-riding and duplication of eﬀort. By contrast, if banks exert a high
level of monitoring when lending individually, free-riding and duplication of eﬀort are
likely to dominate and lead to lower per-project monitoring in the case of multiple-
bank lending. As a consequence, the threshold m depends on the severity of the
banks’ moral hazard problem, which, as already discussed, decreases with E and R
while it increases with c.
An important implication of this discussion is that the incentive mechanism of
the greater diversiﬁcation achievable with multiple-bank lending works only if banks
raise deposits, i.e., if they are leveraged. We have the following.
Corollary 1 Multiple-bank lending always leads to lower per-project monitoring ef-
fort than individual-bank lending (MML <m IL) if banks do not raise deposits (E =1 ).
Proof. See the appendix.
When banks raise deposits, ﬁnancing a greater number of projects reduces the
variance of banks’ portfolio returns thus lowering depositors’ expected shortfalls and
improving monitoring incentives. When banks do not raise deposits, this mechanism
disappears as they are not subject to any moral hazard problem. Importantly, this
14suggests that in our model banks beneﬁt from greater diversiﬁcation only if this
helps reduce the agency problem with depositors and not as a simple risk sharing
mechanism.
Given the previous results, we now analyze how per-project monitoring eﬀorts and
total costs contribute to the determination of the optimal lending structure.
Proposition 5 Higher per-project monitoring eﬀort (MML >m IL)i sn e c e s s a r yf o r
higher banks’ expected proﬁts with multiple-bank lending (πML >π IL)i fmML > mIL
√
2 ,
and is suﬃcient otherwise.
Proof. See the appendix.
The results of Proposition 5 hinge on the interaction between the convexity of the
monitoring cost function and the duplication of eﬀort due to the lack of coordination
in banks’ monitoring choices with multiple-bank lending. If banks individually exert
a level of monitoring higher than mIL
√
2 when they share lending, they incur higher total
costs because the duplication of eﬀort dominates the convexity of the cost function.
In this case, multiple-bank lending leads to higher expected proﬁts for banks only
if higher per-project monitoring eﬀort suﬃces to dominate the higher costs. In con-
trast, when mML ≤ mIL
√
2 , the convexity dominates in lowering total costs and banks
always have greater expected proﬁts if sharing lending leads to greater per-project
monitoring.
Propositions 3-5 imply various combinations of per-project monitoring and total
monitoring costs in determining the proﬁtability of the two lending structures. We
demonstrate the relevance of the various combinations graphically as a function of
the parameters E, R and c. Figure 2 depicts the curves where banks’ expected proﬁts
(πIL and πML), per-project monitoring (mIL and MML) and total monitoring costs
(CIL and CML) are the same in the two lending structures as a function of the cost
of monitoring c and the project return R when banks raise only deposits (E =0 ) . 6
Multiple-bank lending implies higher expected proﬁts, higher per-project monitoring
and lower total costs than individual-bank lending below the respective curve; and
t h eo p p o s i t eh a p p e n sa b o v ee a c hc u r v e .
Insert Figure 2 about here
6The other parameters of the model are ﬁxed to pH =0 .8, pL =0 .6, and y =1 .
15The graph highlights four areas. Multiple-bank lending leads to higher expected prof-
its for banks in all areas except IV, but the determinants of its higher proﬁtability
diﬀer across the areas. Area I depicts the case where multiple-bank lending is more
proﬁtable because higher per-project monitoring (MML >m IL) dominates higher
costs (CML >C IL). Area II shows the case where higher per-project monitoring
suﬃces because costs are lower (CML <C IL). Finally, in area III the convexity
prevails in reducing total costs so that banks have higher expected proﬁts despite
exerting lower per-project monitoring. Overall, the ﬁgure shows the importance of
per-project monitoring. Except in area III, the lending structure with higher per-
project monitoring is always more proﬁtable. As a consequence, the higher proﬁtabil-
ity of multiple-bank lending reﬂects the behavior of per-project monitoring, which,
as shown in Proposition 4, decreases with the return of the project R and increases
with the cost of monitoring c.
To complete the comparative statics, we also analyze how the proﬁtability of the
two lending structures changes with the amount of inside equity E. Figure 3 depicts
the curves where banks’ expected proﬁts are the same with individual and multiple-
bank lending (πIL = πML) as a function of the cost of monitoring and the return of
the project when the amount of inside equity varies from E =0t oE =0 .2( i . e . ,f r o m
D =1t oD =0 .8).
Insert Figure 3 about here
The ﬁgure shows that the attractiveness of multiple-bank lending decreases when
banks are more equity ﬁnanced. Whereas sharing lending is more proﬁtable in areas
Ia n dI Iw h e nE =0 ,i ti sn ol o n g e rs oi na r e aI Ia sE increases. The intuition is as
before. As shown in Proposition 4, a larger fraction of inside equity reduces banks’
moral hazard thus increasing the threshold m. This reduces the range of c and R
where per-project monitoring is higher than with individual-bank lending, thus also
reducing the range of parameters where multiple-bank lending is more proﬁtable.
To summarize these results:7
Proposition 6 Multiple-bank lending leads to higher banks’ expected proﬁts than
7The result that the attractiveness of multiple-bank lending decreases with the project return R
implies also that the fact that banks obtain the full return from lending does not alter our qualitative
results. Assuming that banks obtain loan rates lower than R would not modify our qualitative results
as it would correspond in our framework to a reduction of R.
16individual-bank lending when the amount of inside equity E and the project return
R are low, and the cost of monitoring c is high. Individual-bank lending leads to
higher banks’ expected proﬁts otherwise.
6 Extensions
The essential idea behind multiple-bank lending is that banks have limited loanable
funds that constrain the degree of diversiﬁcation (and thus the level of monitoring)
they can achieve as individual lenders. So far we have considered limits of a “ﬁxed
size” in that banks have one unit of funds each and can ﬁnance either one project as
individual lenders or two projects when sharing lending. We now depart from this
simple set up in two ways. First, we allow banks to increase their size by raising
more deposits and ﬁnance the same number of projects with individual and multiple-
bank lending. Second, we consider an economy with k ≥ 2 banks and analyze how
the beneﬁt of greater diversiﬁcation varies with the number of banks entering into
multiple relationships.
6.1 Leverage versus free-riding
In the basic model we have constrained bank size to one unit and have analyzed
multiple-bank lending as a way for banks to increase the number of projects they
ﬁnance and achieve better diversiﬁcation, for given total loanable funds. We now
extend this framework by letting banks increase their size through more deposits
when acting as individual lenders so as to ﬁnance the same number of projects as
with multiple-bank lending.8 This implies a new trade-oﬀ in the determination of
the more proﬁtable lending structure. Rather than focusing on greater diversiﬁcation
and free-riding as in the basic model, we now focus on the trade-oﬀ between greater
leverage and free-riding as ways to achieve a given (equal) level of diversiﬁcation.
Consider the same economy as in the basic model. For a given amount of inside
equity E each bank can raises an amount of deposits D2 =2− E and ﬁnances two
projects as an individual lender; or it raises D1 =1− E and, as in the basic model,
shares with another bank the ﬁnancing of two projects. Since D2 >D 1, ﬁnancing
8We are grateful to an anonimous referee for suggesting this extension along the lines of Winton
(1995).
17two projects as an individual lender implies higher leverage for the bank and thus,
ceteris paribus, a more severe moral hazard problem in bank monitoring. Following
the same analysis as in the basic model, we can express the bank’s expected proﬁt











i,( 1 3 )
where the success probability is pi = pL+mi∆,[ r − S]D2 = rD2−E max{rjD2−W, 0}
is the expected return to depositors, and W = Xi + X−i is the (total) return from
the loans with i 6= −i. The terms in (13) have the usual meaning with the only
diﬀerence that now individual-bank lending implies ﬁnancing two projects rather
than only one. Note also that, since banks act independently, we focus again on a
single representative bank and avoid subscript j.
The equilibrium is now characterized as follows.
Proposition 7 The equilibrium with individual-bank lending, in which each bank ﬁ-
nances two projects, monitors each project with eﬀort mi = m ,a n do ﬀers the deposit
rate r = r , solves the following two equations:
∆R +
∂S 
∂m D2 − cm
  =0 , (14)
r
  − S
  = y. (15)
Proof. See the appendix, which contains also the expressions for S  and ∂S 
∂m .
The equilibrium in Proposition 7 resembles the one in Proposition 1. The equi-
librium values of monitoring and the deposit rate diﬀer however from those in the
basic model because of the diﬀerent distribution of the return of loans W and the
higher amount of leverage D2. To see whether this new equilibrium with individual-
bank lending leads to higher per-project monitoring than multiple-bank lending, we
compare it with that in Proposition 2. We have the following:
Proposition 8 There exists a value b m ∈ (0,1) such that the per-project monitoring
eﬀort with multiple-bank lending is higher than with individual-bank lending with two
projects (MML >m  ) if the individual monitoring eﬀort is mML >m  . The threshold
b m increases with the amount of equity E.
18Proof. See the appendix.
Proposition 8 shows that multiple-bank lending represents a better way to achieve
greater diversiﬁcation and obtain higher per-project monitoring when banks have a
small amount of inside equity E; while individual-bank lending with higher leverage
is better otherwise. The intuition is simple. When E is small, banks have to raise
a large fraction of deposits in order to be able to ﬁn a n c ea sm a n yp r o j e c t sa sw i t h
multiple-bank lending. This increases ceteris paribus their moral hazard problem and
leads to lower per-project monitoring than with multiple-bank lending. By contrast,
when E is large, increasing leverage to ﬁnance two projects as individual lenders
allows banks to achieve greater diversiﬁcation because this dominates the costs of
free-riding and duplication of eﬀort deriving from multiple-bank lending.
6.2 A larger number of banks
We now extend the basic model by allowing a number of banks k ≥ 2 in the economy.
As before banks have limited loanable funds but can now ﬁnance more projects and
achieve greater diversiﬁcation by sharing lending with a larger number of banks. This
allows us to analyze how the beneﬁto fg r e a t e rd i v e r s i ﬁcation varies with the number
of banks entering into multiple relationships; and to provide a justiﬁcation for the
empirical observation that multiple-bank relationships often consist of many banks.
Consider k ≥ 2 banks with total loanable funds D+E ≥ 1. One way to think about
it is that banks have a ﬁxed amount of inside equity E and are subject to a capital
constraint 1
β (with β>1), which limits the amount they can lend to D + E = βE.9
Banks are then either individual lenders and ﬁnance (D+E) ﬁrms or share ﬁnancing
and lend 1
k to each of k(D + E) projects. The rest of the model is as before. Banks
choose their monitoring eﬀorts after deposit rates are set, and their eﬀorts crucially
depend on the number of projects they ﬁnance.
For the sake of brevity, we now solve the model directly as a function of k rather
than describing the cases of individual and multiple-bank lending separately. Then,
9The idea of binding capital requirements to justiﬁy banks’ limited loanable funds is in line
with Thakor (1996), who provides both theory and evidence that increases in capital requirements
decrease banks’ aggregate lending. Note that capital requirements are distorsive in our framework
as they play no role other than preventing full diversiﬁcation. They can however be justiﬁed in a
more general framework where projects are also subject to common risk factors and fully diversiﬁed
portfolios are still risky (see, e.g., Chiesa, 2001).




and the success probability of project i as
pi = MipH +( 1− Mi)pL = pL + Mi∆,( 1 6 )
with i ∈ {1,...,k(D + E)} and j ∈ {1,k}. Following the same procedure as in the
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where [rj − S]D are the total expected shortfalls to depositors and S is the per-unit
expected shortfall (Section B of the appendix contains the full derivation of (17) and
the exact expression for S in this case). We then characterize the equilibrium.
Proposition 9 The equilibrium is unique and symmetric. Each bank monitors each
project with eﬀort mij = m(k) and oﬀers the deposit rate rj = r(k), where m(k) and







D − cm(k)=0 , (18)
r(k) − S(k)=y. (19)
Proof. See the appendix.
Proposition 9 shows how the trade-oﬀ involved in multiple-bank lending varies
with the number of banks k ﬁnancing the same ﬁrm. On the one hand, increasing k
worsens free-riding and duplication of eﬀort (the term 1
k(1 − m(k))k−1), and reduces
further banks’ monitoring incentives. On the other hand, a higher k allows banks to
ﬁnance a greater number of projects when entering into multiple-bank lending (from
(D+E)t ok(D +E)w i t hk>2). This lowers the variance of the distribution of the
loan returns and expected shortfalls by more relative to the case with k =2 ,t h u s
enlarging the impact of diversiﬁcation on banks’ incentives. Note that for k =1a n d
k = 2 the equilibrium reduces to the same as that described in Proposition 1 and 2,
respectively, if also D + E =1.
20This discussion suggests that sharing lending with a number of banks k>2m a y
eventually lead to higher per-project monitoring than individual-bank lending even
when this is not the case for k = 2. Figures 4 provides an example of when this
can happen by depicting how individual and per-project monitoring eﬀorts m(k)a n d
M(k) change as a function of the number of banks k when E =0 .5a n dβ =1 2( w h i c h
corresponds to capital requirements of 8%).10
Insert Figure 4 about here
The example in Figure 4 shows that the marginal beneﬁt of greater diversiﬁcation
can increase faster than the drawbacks of free-riding and duplication of eﬀort with
k, and it eventually dominates leading to a higher per-project monitoring when k is




¯ ¯ ¯ in (18)
capturing the incentive mechanism of greater diversiﬁcation decreases with k.T h e
question is then how fast it decreases, and how it compares to the other terms in
(18) representing the costs of free-riding and duplication of eﬀort in determining the
optimal number of monitors. We have the following results.




¯ ¯ ¯ → 0 as k →∞ .
Proposition 10 suggests that sharing lending with an inﬁnite number of banks
would allow banks to achieve full diversiﬁcation and eliminate the bankruptcy risk
embodied in the deposit contract. However, banks may choose not to do it.
Proposition 11 Banks ﬁnd it optimal to enter into multiple relationships with a
ﬁnite number of banks.
Proof. The proof follows immediately from the previous proposition and from the
fact that the left hand side of (18) becomes negative as k →∞ .
Diﬀerently from the basic model, banks now have the possibility to increase the
number of banks with which they share ﬁnancing and achieve full diversiﬁcation.
10The other parameters of the model are R =1 .52, c =0 .35,p H =0 .8, pL =0 .6, and y =1 . Note
also that now we approximate the distribution of the returns of banks’ portfolios with a Normal
distribution.
21However, they do not ﬁnd it optimal to do so. As Proposition 10 and 11 suggest, the
optimal number of banks is ﬁnite since as k increases the costs in terms of free-riding
and duplication of eﬀort eventually dominate the beneﬁt of greater diversiﬁcation.
This result also suggests once again that in our model diversiﬁcation is not beneﬁcial
in terms of risk sharing but only as a way to reduce depositors’ expected shortfalls
and improve banks’ monitoring incentives. When the limit to this beneﬁt is reached,
diversifying further is no longer desirable.
7 Discussion
In this section we analyze various aspects of our model. Speciﬁcally, we discuss
banks’ limited lending capacities, other diversiﬁcation opportunities, and alternative
monitoring technologies.
Limits to diversiﬁcation
The key idea behind the optimality of multiple-bank lending is that banks have lim-
ited diversiﬁcation opportunities and cannot fully diversify when lending individually.
As one way to justify this, we have so far assumed that banks have limited loanable
funds. More generally though, any situation which constrains banks’ diversiﬁcation
opportunities is consistent with our theory. Examples are restrictions on banks’ ge-
ographical scope and sector specialization. There is evidence that lending to ﬁrms
located at distant locations can be more costly because of information problems,
transportation costs, and, if located in foreign regions, diﬀerences in legal systems,
supervisory regimes, corporate governance, language and cultural conditions (e.g.,
Acharya et al., 2006). All these factors may limit the number of projects that banks
can proﬁtably ﬁnance as individual lenders, and thus, as in our model, leave scope
for multiple-bank lending.
Alternative diversiﬁcation opportunities
So far we have considered how banks can achieve better diversiﬁcation by sharing
lending with other banks or by increasing leverage. In practice, however, there are
other ways to do it. The most immediate is raising outside equity. This relaxes the
limits on loanable funds, but it may be neither feasible (at least in the short term) nor
22optimal. Outside equity introduces in fact another agency problem between banks and
equity holders, which reduces banks’ incentives to monitor and is not ameliorated by
greater diversiﬁcation (Cerasi and Daltung, 2000). Moreover, as is well known from
the corporate ﬁnance literature, raising outside equity is more costly in terms of
foregone tax advantages, asymmetric information, and transaction costs than other
forms of ﬁnancing (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976; and numerous articles that have
followed it). These considerations suggest that, even if allowed to raise outside equity,
banks are likely to remain capital constrained and may still choose multiple-bank
lending as a way to achieve better diversiﬁcation.
Another way for banks to achieve greater diversiﬁcation for given total loanable
funds is to issue credit derivatives, such as credit default swaps. In our context,
this implies the possibility for banks to act as single lenders and buy protection
against borrowers’ default at date 1 in exchange for a ﬁxed initial fee. The eﬀects
of these instruments depend crucially on the identity of the seller, and the payment
that the buyer receives in the case of default of some risky assets (“transfer”). If
banks buy protection from dispersed investors, their monitoring incentives worsen.
Like all forms of insurance, banks’ incentives decrease in the size of the transfer they
receive in the case of default.11 By contrast, if banks exchange credit derivatives
among each other on their loans, their monitoring incentives may improve. As with
multiple-bank lending, now all banks (both buyers and sellers of protection) monitor
the risky projects underlying the credit derivatives, and, depending on the size of
the transfer, they exert asymmetric or symmetric eﬀorts. In this sense, the exchange
of credit derivatives allows banks to achieve levels of diversiﬁcation, free-riding and
duplication of eﬀorts in between those attainable with individual and multiple-bank
lending, and it leads to the same results as in each of them for extreme amounts of
the transfer. Note however that credit derivatives are a relatively new innovation,
and as such they are currently not available in all countries and for all types of banks.
Alternative monitoring technologies
The monitoring technology we have assumed so far gives banks a direct form of
control on ﬁrms’ behavior in that it allows banks to detect ﬁrms’ project choices and
11The result may be diﬀerent if the credit risk transfer refers to the entire portfolio in the presence
of aggregate risk (see, e.g., Chiesa, 2006).
23intervene in case of misbehavior. Other forms of control are, however, plausible. For
example, through monitoring banks could observe ﬁrms’ behavior and liquidate them
for a total value of C (e.g., Rajan and Winton, 1995). Whether this leads to diﬀerent
results for the optimality of multiple-bank lending depends on how the liquidation
value C is allocated among banks. Our qualitative results still hold if banks share C
equally in case of default independently of whether they monitor. Results may diﬀer,
however, if a monitoring bank is the ﬁrst to seize C. This reduces free-riding, but
it may still reduce the attractiveness of multiple-bank lending if it leads to excessive
duplication of eﬀort.
8 Empirical implications
The main insight of the paper is to show that multiple-bank lending can be beneﬁcial
as it allows banks to increase the overall eﬀort with which they monitor ﬁrms. This
occurs when banks have low inside equity, the returns of ﬁrm projects are low and the
cost of monitoring is high. The model thus has a number of empirical implications for
the determinants of multiple-bank lending, some of which are consistent with recent
empirical ﬁndings.
First, the attractiveness of multiple-bank lending should decrease as banks have
more inside equity. One way for banks to reach this is through mergers and acqui-
sitions. Consistent with this, Karceski et al. (2004) and Degryse et al. (2004) ﬁnd
that, following consolidation, banks are more likely to terminate lending relationships
with ﬁrms borrowing from multiple banks.
Second, the model predicts that multiple-bank lending should be optimal when
banks lend to ﬁrms with low ex ante proﬁtability, as is found by Detragiache et al.
(2000), Petersen and Rajan (1994), Farinha and Santos (2002) and Guiso and Minetti
(2006).
Third, the cost of monitoring refers to the ease with which banks can acquire
information about ﬁr m s ;a n di ti sl i n k e dt oﬁrms’ transparency as it can be aﬀected,
for example, by disclosure and accounting standards. Also, to the extent that they
aﬀect banks’ information acquisition in diﬀerent sectors or geographical areas, the size
of the cost of monitoring is negatively related to the degree of ﬁnancial integration
and positively with the level of regulatory restrictions. Thus, banks should share
24lending when ﬁnancing more opaque ﬁrms, and in sectors and/or countries with laxer
accounting and disclosure standards, less integrated and more regulated markets. In
line with this, Guiso and Minetti (2006) ﬁnd that more informationally transparent
ﬁrms use less multiple-bank lending as public information mitigates the costs banks
have to incur in monitoring entrepreneurs.
9C o n c l u s i o n
This paper analyzes the optimality of multiple-bank relationships in a context where
banks have limited diversiﬁcation opportunities and are subject to a moral hazard
problem in monitoring. Multiple-bank lending involves a trade oﬀ in terms of greater
diversiﬁcation, free-riding and duplication of eﬀort; and leads to higher per-project
monitoring than individual-bank lending whenever the beneﬁto fg r e a t e rd i v e r s i ﬁ-
cation dominates. The attractiveness of multiple-bank lending decreases with the
amount of banks’ inside equity and ﬁrms’ prior proﬁtability, whereas it increases with
the cost of monitoring.
The two important features of the analysis −leverage and limited diversiﬁcation
opportunities− capture two important aspects of the banking industry; and, together
with the role of banks as monitors, make the analysis suitable for explaining the
ﬁnancing of small and medium businesses. In this respect, the paper departs from
Diamond’s theory of banks as delegated monitors in suggesting that, when banks
have limited diversiﬁcation opportunities, overall monitoring may be increasing with
the number of monitors; and it provides an alternative to the hold-up and the soft-
budget-constraint theories in explaining the optimality of multiple-bank relationships.
We develop the analysis under the assumption that all banks share ﬁnancing
equally when they enter into multiple-bank relationships. Allowing for asymmetric
shares of ﬁnancing would lead to results somewhere between those obtained with
multiple banks with symmetric shares and banks lending individually, and it might
explain some other important features of the banking systems such as the emergence
and the role of “housebanks” or some type of credit derivatives. This analysis, to-
gether with a deeper understanding of the eﬀects of syndicates and credit derivatives
on information production constitute interesting avenues for future research.
25A Banks’ expected proﬁts in the basic model with
multiple-bank lending
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where pi is given by (6), i ∈ {1,2} and i 6= −i. The expected proﬁto fb a n kj is








with j ∈ {1,2}. This can be rewritten using the transformation max{0,x} = x +
max{0,−x} as








This expression simpliﬁe st o( 8 )o n c ew es u b s t i t u t e( 2 0 )a n d[ rj − S]D = rjD −
E max{rjD − Z,0},w h e r eS is given by
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(21)
B Banks’ expected proﬁts for k ≥ 2
Banks’ expected proﬁts for k ≥ 2 are a generalization of the expressions in the basic
model once we take into account that banks invest now in k(D + E)p r o j e c t s .T h i s
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where pi is given by (16) and, as in the rest of the appendix, for brevity we use
N = k(D + E)s ot h a ti ∈ {1,...,N}. The expected proﬁto fb a n kj is then








26which, using again the transformation max{0,x} = x+max{0,−x}, can be rewritten
as
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The expression can be further simpliﬁed to (17) once we substitute (22) and [rj −



























for i 6= −i,w h e r ev is the number of successful projects.
CP r o o f s
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 :For a given r, the bank chooses m to maximize (2) with
S =( 1− p)r.T h e ﬁrst order condition gives (3), where ∂SIL
∂mIL = −∆rIL. Setting
[r − S]=y after substituting mIL gives (4). 2
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 :For a given rj, each bank j chooses mij to maximize (8).













− cmij =0 ,
(25)
for i,j ∈ {1,2}, i 6= −i and j 6= −j. To see that there exists a unique equilibrium,





The negative sign of the second order condition for any mi,−j indicates that banks’
expected proﬁts are globally concave, thus implying that the ﬁrst order conditions
are binding in equilibrium. Furthermore, it is easy to derive from the ratio of the ﬁrst





∂mi,−j =0t h a t
(1 − mi,−j)mij =( 1− mij)mi,−j.
It follows that the unique equilibrium is symmetric. In this case, using mij = mi,−j =




















27We can then rearrange (25) as in (9), where
∂SML

















Expression (10) follows from [r − S]=y after substituting mML. 2
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 :We compare mIL and MML in equilibrium. To do this,
we substitute the investors’ individual rationality constraints in the respective ﬁrst
order conditions for the monitoring eﬀorts, and we then compare them.
With individual-bank lending, we substitute (4) in (3) with SIL =( 1− pIL)rIL,
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where pIL = pL + mIL∆.
With multiple-bank lending, we have to distinguish two cases, depending on
whether rMLD is above or below R
2.
Case (i): rMLD<R
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∆. We can then rearrange (29)
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c(2 − pL − (2m − m2)∆)
.
28The function gives the values f(0) = −
∆yD
c(2−pL) < 0a n df(1) →∞ , and it is monoton-
ically increasing in m ∈ [0,1]. Thus, there must exist a value m ∈ (0,1] such that
f(m)=mIL. This implies that MML <m IL if mML < m,a n dMML ≥ mIL if
mML ≥ m where m = f−1(mIL).
Case (ii): rMLD>R
2. In this case, (26) is equal to
∂SML
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We can then rewrite (32) as
(R − r
MLD)p
ML = R −
yD
pML










,( 3 3 )
where pML = pL+MML∆. We can then compare mIL and MML using (27) and (33).





The function gives values g(0) = 0 and g(1) →∞ , and it is monotonically increasing
in m ∈ [0,1]. Thus, there must exist a threshold value m ∈ (0,1] such that g(m)=
mIL. This implies that MML <m IL if mML < m,a n dMML ≥ mIL if mML ≥ m
where m = g−1 ¡
mIL¢
. 2
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 : From the proof of Proposition 3, m is deﬁned as m =
f−1 ¡
mIL¢
in case (i) and m = g−1 ¡
mIL¢
in case (ii). Since both f(m)a n dg(m)a r e
increasing monotonic functions, m is like this as well. It follows that m also increases
with mIL. From equation (27), it can be easily seen that mIL increases with E,w h e r e
E =1− D,a n dR, and decreases with c. The proposition follows. 2
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so that the corollary follows. 2
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 :Recall that pIL = pL + mIL∆ and pML = pL + MML∆.
























Then we have Γ > 0i fmML < mIL
√
2 and Γ < 0i fmML > mIL
√
2 . It follows that
MML >m IL is a necessary condition for πML >π IL if mML > mIL
√
2 , and it is a
suﬃcient condition if mML < mIL
√
2 . 2
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n7 : For a given r, the bank chooses mi to maximize (13)
where
S = r(1 − pi)(1 − p−i)+
1
D2
max{rD2 − R,0}[pi(1 − p−i)+p−i(1 − pi)],










= −r(1 − p−i)∆ +
1
D2
max{rD2 − R,0}(1 − 2p−i)∆.
In the symmetric case pi = p−i = p ,m i = m−i = m , (34) becomes (14). Setting
[r − S]=y after substituting m  gives (15). 2
Proof of Proposition 8: The proof is similar to that of Proposition 3. We com-
pare m  and MML in equilibrium by substituting the investors’ individual rationality
30constraints in the respective ﬁrst order conditions for the monitoring eﬀorts. The
only diﬀerence is that now also with individual-bank lending we have to distinguish
two cases, as r D2 can be above or below R. W et h e nh a v et oc o m p a r ef o u rc a s e s ,
depending on whether r D2 and rMLD1 are above or below R and R
2, respectively. For
t h es a k eo fb r e v i t y ,w el i m i th e r et h ep r o o ft ot w oc a s e s .T h ep r o o fo ft h er e m a i n i n g
c a s e si sa v a i l a b l ef r o mt h ea u t h o r su p o nr e q u e s t .
Case (i): r D2 <Rand rMLD1 < R




R − (2 − E)
y(1 − p )




where p  = pL+m ∆. The case with multiple-bank lending is the same as in the proof
of Proposition 3. We can then compare m  and MML by using (35) and (30), where
D1 =1− E. To do this, we rearrange (30) as
∆
∙






























∆yE[1 − pL − (2m − m2)∆]
c[pL +( 2 m − m2)∆][2− pL − (2m − m2)∆]
.
The function gives the values h(0) = −
∆yE(1−pL)
cpL(2−pL) < 0a n dh(1) →∞ , and it is
monotonically increasing in m ∈ [0,1]. Thus, there must exist a value b m ∈ (0,1] such
that h(b m)=m . T h i si m p l i e st h a tMML <m   if mML < b m,a n dMML ≥ m  if
mML ≥ b m where b m = h−1(m ).
Case (ii): r D2 >Rand rMLD1 > R
2. A sb e f o r e ,w es u b s t i t u t e( 1 5 )i n( 1 4 )w i t h














where p  = pL + m ∆. To compare m  and MML,w et h e nr e a r r a n g e( 3 3 )w i t hD1 =

















31where pML = pL +MML∆ = pL +(2mML−
¡
mML¢2)∆.D e ﬁning the right hand side






c[pL +( 2 m − m2)∆]
,
we have that ϕ(0) = −
∆yE
cpL < 0a n dϕ(1) →∞ ,w i t hϕ(m) being monotonically
increasing in m ∈ [0,1]. Thus, there must exist a value b m ∈ (0,1] such that ϕ(b m)=
m .T h i si m p l i e st h a tMML <m   if mML < b m,a n dMML ≥ m  if mML ≥ b m where
b m = ϕ−1(m ).
For the same argument as in the proof of Proposition 4, the thresholds b m =
h−1(m )a n db m = ϕ−1(m ) are increasing in m , and are thus increasing in E. 2
Proof of Proposition 9: For a given rj,e a c hb a n kj chooses mij to maximize (23).
The ﬁrst order condition is given by
∂πj











p−i)N−v−1] − cmij =0
for i ∈ {1,...,N}, i 6= −i, j ∈ {1...,k} and j 6= −j, when all −j banks exert an
eﬀort mi,−j on project i and all other −i projects have a success probability p−i.T h e





The negative sign of the second order condition for any mi,−j indicates again that
banks’ expected proﬁts are globally concave and consequently that the ﬁrst order
conditions are binding in equilibrium. Furthermore, from the ratio of the ﬁrst order







It follows that the equilibrium in the monitoring eﬀorts is unique and symmetric.
Using then mij = m(k), pi = p−i = p(k)a n drj = r−j = r(k), the expression of the















where v is the number of successful projects. Then we can rearrange the ﬁrst order
















N−v−1 [v − Np(k)](1 − m(k))
k−1∆.
(37)
32Finally, setting [r − S]=y after substituting m(k)i m p l i e s( 1 9 ) .2




¯ ¯ ¯ =0 .T od ot h i s




¯ ¯ ¯ for any k,w h e r e
∂S(k)
∂m(k)D is given




¯ ¯ ¯ =0












N−v−1 [NpH − v]∆.













, 1 ≥ (1 −















































N−v = Np(k). As k →∞ , p(k)=pH,b e c a u s e




¯ ¯ ¯ = 0 as limk→∞ Θ(k)=0 .2
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36Fig. 1. Timing of the model.
T=0 T=1
|| |
each bank sets a each bank projects
deposit rate, raises chooses its mature;
funds and makes loans monitoring claims















Fig 2. Banks’ expected profits, per-project monitoring and total monitoring costs with individual and multiple-bank 
lending. The figure shows the curves where banks’ expected profits, per-project monitoring and total costs with individual 
lending (ΠIL, mIL and  CIL) are equal to those with multiple-bank lending (ΠML, MMLandCML ) as functions of the monitoring 
cost c and the project return R. The figure shows four areas: I where ΠML  > ΠIL  , MML>m IL and CML > CIL ; II where ΠML  >
ΠIL  , MML>m IL and CML  < CIL; III where ΠML  > ΠIL  , MML <m IL and CML  < CIL; IV where ΠML  < ΠIL  , MML <m IL and





IVFig 3. Banks’ expected profits with individual and multiple-bank lending. The figure shows the curves where banks’
expected profits with individual lending ΠIL are equal to those with multiple-bank lending ΠML for different values of inside 
equity (E=0 and E=0.2) as functions of the monitoring cost c and the project return R. The figure shows three areas: I where 
ΠML> ΠIL for both E=0 and E=0.2; II where ΠML(E=0) >ΠIL(E=0) but ΠML(E=0.2) < ΠIL(E=0.2); III where ΠML< ΠILfor 
















ΠIL(E=0.2)= ΠML(E=0.2)Fig. 4. Individual and per-project total monitoring efforts. The figure shows how the individual monitoring effort m(k) and 
the per-project total monitoring effort M(k) change as a function of the number of banks k. The figure is drawn for inside equity 
E=0.5, project return R=1.52, cost of of monitoring c=0.35, capital requirement equal to 8% , success probabilities of the 
project pH=0.8 and pL=0.6, alternative return y=1.
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